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Introduction  
The British Empire come into the height of its power at the end of the nineteenth century, 
spanning the globe as the world’s premier military and economic power. The crown jewel of this 
empire was India, a possession which provided enormous resources, not least of which was its 
large population.1 From this population came the British Indian Army, the force which provided 
the backbone of the British military and helped spread and maintain control across the 
subcontinent and the entire globe. The native soldiers of this force were called sepoys,2 
volunteers who served under British officers. Though they lacked the love of king and country 
that their British counterparts had, sepoys proved to be an effective and reliable fighting force 
within India and abroad.  
 After years of fighting in Burma, Afghanistan, and Africa, the 1890s saw a period of 
reorganization for the Indian Army. Historically, military forces in British India were 
decentralized, comprising three separate armies under the control of the Madras, Bombay, and 
Bengal Presidencies.3 This system was established by the British East India Company in the 
1700s and continued in use through to 1895, when the three armies were consolidated into one 
unified force. Though this unified force would prove a valuable asset in the coming world wars, 
the unification was a contested process motivated by competing, and ultimately unrealized, fears 
of internal revolt and Russian expansionism.   
 
1 In 1891, the population of India was 287,000,000. The United Kingdom had a population of only 38,000,000. 
These figures are from the 1891 census of India and the 1891 census of the United Kingdom. India supplied several 
million soldiers to Britain in WWI and WWII. 
2 The word “sepoy” is of Persian origin, having come into use during the Mughal rule to refer to foot soldiers. Its use 
was continued by the British East India Company and the British Raj, as well as by the French and Portuguese, who 
also employed Indian soldiers. “Sepoy” continues in use with modern South Asian states. Titles, uniforms, and other 
traditions illustrate continuity in the military history of South Asia.  
3 Presidencies were administrative units similar in concept to provinces or states. A map locating these presidencies 
is included at the end of this paper.  
Cameron Moeller 
Final Draft 
December 2nd, 2019 
3 
 
 In the background of reorganization was the memory of the Mutiny of 1857, variously 
termed a rebellion, revolt, and war of independence, during which sepoys turned against their 
British officers, triggering a widespread civil uprising against British rule. Though it was 
ultimately put down following fierce fighting, the threat of mutiny and civil revolt remained a 
prominent fear for the British and continued to be referred to for many decades after. Many army 
officers saw mutiny followed by popular revolt as the greatest threat to India, and thus 
maintained that the primary focus of the army should be on internal security. These officers 
wanted the Army decentralized and dispersed across the colony on bases close to the larger cities 
to limit the possibility and extent of any future revolt. This view, favoring a “garrison state,”4 did 
not preclude the use of Indian forces overseas, it merely made the expeditionary deployment of 
forces a secondary priority when considering how to organize the army. Officers from this 
internally-focused school of thought preferred to maintain the three separate presidency armies 
as a buffer against revolt throughout the entire army, reasoning that a mutiny in one army was 
less likely to spread to the others.5  
 On the other side of this policy debate were those who considered the main threat to be 
Russian territorial encroachment in the northwest. In what would be termed “The Great Game,”6 
the British and Russian Empires vied for dominance in Central and South Asia. British officers 
in this camp acknowledged the risk of internal revolt, openly admitting that even the best Indian 
soldiers were likely to turn against them should the tide of war shift, as they were loyal not to the 
 
4 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: the Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947 (New 
Delhi: Sage. 2005).  
5 Examples of the arguments from officers both for and against this school of thought can be found in 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7034, “Substitution of military police for troops in the Chin Hills and proposed reduction of a Madras 
infantry regiment.” 24 October 1894.  
6 The phrase “The Great Game,” as used to describe the geopolitical struggle over Central Asia, originated from the 
correspondence of a British political officer in the 1840s. The term was popularized through the works of Rudyard 
Kipling at the turn of the twentieth century.   
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Crown but to their paymaster. Despite this, it was argued that a larger, centralized army was 
more capable of standing up against the Russians and maintaining control of India. To minimize 
the threat of mutiny, these officers sought to dampen sepoy discontent through targeted 
recruitment, sufficient wages and other inducements, acceptable disciplinary treatment, and 
increasing the proportion of British soldiers relative to sepoys to maintain order.7 
 One of the few areas of agreement between these two factions was the need to select only 
the most loyal, capable, and martial recruits. To this end, the British devised the concept of 
“martial races.” This concept focused not on the characteristics of the individual recruit, but on 
certain desirable characteristics of the group, or “race,” that the recruit came from. Members of 
“races” which were deemed to be “martial” were recruited, while those belonging to “non-
martial” races generally could not serve. Non-martial races and lower classes were seen as 
inherently disloyal, incapable, and undisciplined, and thus entirely unfit for military service. By 
cutting down the number of “races” amongst which to look for recruits, the British devised a 
practice by which they thought they could maximize the number of quality soldiers. The goal 
was to create a superior army composed of “martial races,” comparatively better soldiers who 
would willingly choose to join, as opposed to an army of conscripts, criminals, the poor, or 
others who would join as a last resort, as is often the case with military service. The quasi-
sociological concept of martial races therefore became a central component of recruiting and 
organizing the Indian Army, and its validity was not questioned by the British. 
 
7 An excellent example of the debate between internal and external focuses can be seen in the correspondence of 
Field Marshal Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief in India 1885–1893. Roberts himself was strongly in 
favor of a unified army, but even as Commander-in-Chief was unable to convince his superiors in England, though 
not for lack of trying. Many other officers, belonging both to the internally and externally focused schools, voiced 
their opinions in letters to Roberts. See letters LXXIX CIV, CXXIV, CXXVII, CXLVI, CLXVII, CLXXV, CCXI, 
CCXXV, and CCLXVIII in Indian Series: Correspondence with England While Commander-in-Chief in India, 3rd 
January 1890 to 8th March 1893. Vol. IX, (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 
1893).  
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Scholarly understanding of martial races has developed over time, becoming part of a 
wider critical theory on British classification as a means of rule. Though the British believed 
their racial classifications to be innate, scholars have questioned this assumption, seeing it as 
another misguided attempt at “scientific” classification of people through a Western lens. Others 
have pointed out that even the British understanding of martial races shifted over time. Gajendra 
Singh, in his 2014 work The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between 
Self and Sepoy illustrated that which races were considered martial varied over time, with certain 
groups written into and out of the “martial lore.” Kaushik Roy made similar arguments in his 
2008 work Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment and the Mechanics of Command in the 
Sepoy Army, 1859-1913, documenting the evolution of British perceptions on martial races.8 At 
any given time, certain races extolled for their martial prowess were heavily recruited and made 
up a larger percentage of the Indian Army. Over time, however, these races would fall out of 
favor, making up smaller percentages of the Army as they were replaced by other groups. Citing 
the variability of the concept of martial races at different points in time, Singh questioned the 
idea of a single martial race theory, instead pointing out a variety of different theories. Though 
this work has provided valuable insight, it portrays shifts in the perception and classification of 
martial races as more gradual and more widely accepted than I believe they really were. 
 My own examination of primary official documents from the 1890s show that British 
ideas on martial races varied and clashed not only over time, but also at a single point in time. 
Different army officers held widely different opinions as to which groups were and were not 
martial, and they sought to racially organize their units as they saw fit. These differing opinions 
 
8 Kaushik Roy is a preeminent scholar of the Indian Army. His research on the concept of martial race has provided 
an invaluable foundation on which I seek to add.  
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were hotly debated, both across the subcontinent and within the same regions as officers 
recruited and traded different races to their liking. Sepoys were recruited, swapped, and mustered 
out of service based on the peculiar martial race ideas in vogue with their respective officers. 
Though this constant debate and change would seem to call into question just how innate 
“martialness” really was, the British did not question the validity of martial races, merely which 
groups should be considered as martial. This flexibility (or confusion) actually allowed the 
British to adapt to changing experiences, and thus to continue to rely on the concept of martial 
races as a relevant guide for recruitment. The great degree of variation and continuous debate 
show that “martial race” is not properly understood as a unified theory, or even as a general 
consensus that changes over time, but as a series of hotly contested arguments with different 
officer pulling in different directions. Larger changes over time were the result of this back and 
forth, with certain races happening to emerge as more popular, though never universally 
accepted, in any given period.  
At the center of this back and forth were the resplendent sepoys themselves.9 Though 
they lacked any direct voice in the debate over martial races, they wielded indirect influence over 
British decisions. British rule in India was dependent on sepoys, all of whom were volunteers. In 
order to draw in volunteers, a variety of inducements had to be offered, such as pay, promotions, 
pensions, and an array of bonuses known as batta. These inducements had to be kept up 
throughout the duration of sepoys’ service, generally 20 years for enlisted men, lest the 
 
9 Regrettably, the primary sources used in this paper, namely India Office records and correspondence of British 
officers, provide only the British perspective of the relationship between sepoys and their British superiors. Sources 
from an Indian perspective were unavailable due to lack of documentation and language barriers. Sepoys would 
undoubtedly see their situation quite differently, and it is important to remember and attempt to account for the 
inherent bias and prejudice of one-sided sources. Despite this bias, there are still some meaningful glimpses at the 
position of sepoys, what experiences they had, and what role they played in the Indian Army, both directly and 
indirectly.  
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disappointed sepoys refuse orders or even revolt, as they had in 1857. Sepoys had a passive 
negotiating advantage in this system, as the British were unable to rely on more coercive means 
of maintaining loyalty and discipline without pushing away recruits. For those groups deemed 
martial, military service opened up a variety of opportunities for income and social advancement. 
Thus, the need to satisfy sepoys’ expectations ensured acceptable treatment and sufficient 
compensation to continue serving their fickle British officers.10 
Race and Martialness 
The term “martial race” was used by the British to describe groups which they considered 
better fit for military service. Similar adjectives, like “military,” “fighting,” and “warlike” were 
also used, and terms like “group,” “tribe,” “class,” and “caste” were sometimes used in place of 
“race.” Scholars of the Indian Army have identified this racial classification as a ubiquitous 
component of the Indian Army, and have, in the latter decades of the twentieth century, settled 
on “martial race” as the standardized term.11 “Martial race” is thus a period British concept, a 
label used to describe specific groups, and a modern term of art to refer to a British concept of 
racial classification. The scholarly understanding of the concept of martial races is sometimes 
referred to as “martial race theory.”  
The meaning of the word “race” as used by the British in India is quite different from the 
popular American understanding of the word. Instead of a few broad categories based on skin 
color, such as “white” or “black,” race was based on a variety of biological factors and cultural 
 
10 Notwithstanding the overall need to attract and offer benefits to sepoys, sepoys could still face harsh discipline 
and abuse. There were occasional brutal beatings and murders of sepoys by their British officers. These moments 
were widely publicized in Indian-owned newspapers and contributed to nationalist discontent. Further, the army 
wielded a considerable disciplinary apparatus based in courts-martial where soldiers were virtually powerless. 
11 For a more detailed history of scholarship on the concept of martial races, see chapter 1 of Gajendra Singh, The 
Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2015).  
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characteristics used by British officers to distinguish different groups of Indian people, similar to 
the modern definition of ethnicity. Common characteristics such as language, region of origin, 
religion, physical attributes, and elements of culture could all play a role in defining a “race,” as 
could the more uniquely South Asian concept of caste, which divided Indian society into broad 
groups based on occupation and kinship connections. The word “caste,” though properly 
describing a different sort of classification, was often used interchangeably with the words 
“race,” “class,” and “tribe,” by the British.12   
 The ethnic diversity of India provided fertile ground for Victorian Englishmen, enthralled 
by quasi-scientific notions of race, to classify and rank the people they ruled.13 Early English 
attempts at studying India were guided by a desire to learn the languages and customs of the 
many people they encountered. Looking through imperial eyes, the early study of India, and Asia 
more generally, briefly spawned a romanticized interest in the far off, exotic lands of the Orient. 
By the mid-1800s, Europe had become obsessed with even more overtly racist and paternalistic 
attempts at classifying and ranking the conquered peoples of its colonies. These classifications 
were used to justify colonization, casting Europeans as bringers of civilization and modernity to 
the rest of the world. This desire to classify and order coincided with the 1857 mutiny in India, 
which saw the British government taking formal control in India from the East India Company 
and purging the army of forces that had been disloyal. Martial capability thus became an 
 
12 Caste, from the Portuguese term casta, is the European term that refers to the indigenous South Asian 
classification system of jati, which has foundations in occupation, lineage, status, and religious hierarchy. 
13 The British obsession with racially classifying the native populations of their colonies was by no means limited to 
India, and would play out all across the empire. Other European empires also engaged in this endeavor, often with 
devastating and lasting consequences. 
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important component of British racial classification as the army was reformed to draw recruits 
from more loyal – or at least more reliable – “races.”14   
 Of the many race, ethnic, and caste groups that were classified, only a select few were 
seen by the British to be martial, that is, naturally and culturally best fit for military service. Just 
as with race, specifically martial races were unevenly defined on the basis of various, supposedly 
innate, characteristics. Some races were considered martial primarily because of their religion or 
region of origin, while others were judged by their physical stature. Once these races had 
experienced combat, their performance, loyalty, and bravery were reviewed and factored in. 
While these characteristics were all widely agreed to be important, just how important they were 
relative to one another varied based on the situation and, most strikingly, the opinions of 
individual officers.15 
 Despite the shifting criteria of martialness, there were some general trends. For example, 
Hindus were generally seen as less martial than Muslims, often considered cowardly and less 
honorable. Notable exceptions, however, were the Rajputs, Gurkhas, and Sikhs (who considered 
themselves a separate religion from Hinduism, but were seen as Hindu by the British), 16 who are 
often cited as perfect exemplars of martial characteristics. Other general trends were a preference 
for agriculturalists, who generally had greater physiques and had not been “spoiled” by the 
comforts of urbanity. 17 Similarly, groups from the northwest, such as Sikhs in the Punjab and 
 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the British study of Asia and the racial reorganization of the Indian Army after 
the 1857 mutiny, see Pradeep Barua, “Inventing Race: the British and India’s Martial Races,” The Historian 58, no. 
1 (1995): 107–116. 
15 For a more detailed discussion of these different characteristics and how British officers in different time periods 
thought of them, see chapter 1 of Kaushik Roy, Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment and the Mechanics of 
Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913, (New Delhi: Manohar. 2008). 
16 Though Sikhs consider themselves to be a distinct religion from Hinduism, British records tend to classify them as 
Hindu when discussing the balance of Hindus and Muslims in specific units. One such example can be seen in 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7085, “Changes in the cast construction of regiments: Bengal Army.” 6 October 1898.  
17 Many British officers expressed a preference for rural groups, seeing them as more rugged and possessing a 
stronger physique than their urban counterparts, who lived a comparatively less physically demanding lifestyle. The 
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Pashtuns in Afghanistan, were seen as tougher and more martial due to their robust physique.18 
The concept of martial race relied on different levels of identity, varying between different 
officers and in different contexts. For example, an officer might consider most Muslims to be 
martial, or just Muslims from the northwest, or just Pashtuns, or even just Pashtuns from a 
specific tribe. 
Even though martial races were British classifications, they were not invented entirely 
from whole cloth; while the members of these groups did not see themselves as members of a 
“race,” they did often share self-ascribed identities. Some groups even had their own martial 
ideals, such as Rajputs, who identified themselves as Kshatriya, members of the warrior 
component of the four-fold varna classification system of Hindu caste society. Similarly, Sikhs 
saw themselves as the bearers of a long tradition of military glory, and Pashtuns maintained 
conscious legends and traditions of armed self-defense against conquest. However, the relative 
importance that the British placed on certain identities certainly differed from that placed on 
them by Indians, who, like everyone else, possessed many different identities, ranging from 
family to region to religion. The only identity that the British cared about, however, was that 
which was deemed martial.19  
 Innateness was a key part of the concept of martial races, as it explains why certain races 
were considered more martial than others regardless of training or individual characteristics. 
 
idea that urbanites are “soft” or “city slickers” is not uncommon even today. For discussion of the period Indian 
context, see chapter 1 of Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self 
and Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).   
18 Though not universal, this view was commonly held by many British officers. In particular, Field Marshal 
Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief in India from 1885–1893, wrote voluminously on his preference for 
Northwesterners. He saw them as fickle but superbly brave and hardy. See letters LV, CXXXIX, LXXIX, and 
CCXX in Indian Series: Correspondence with England While Commander-in-Chief in India, 3rd January 1890 to 
8th March 1893. Vol. IX, (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1893). 
19 Henceforth, the terms “race” and “martial race” will be used without quotation marks of suspicion, but with the 
understanding that the racial views of British officers and officials were unscientific and are unacceptable in modern 
usage.   
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Innateness is what gave legitimacy to the endeavor of classifying races in the first place. But the 
understanding of innateness itself had a degree of variability. In some instances, characteristics 
the British considered martial were heritable (or genetic, in modern terminology), and were 
passed on from one generation to the next. Traits like stature and personality could be heritable, 
and thus fit with this model of innateness. However, stature could also be influenced by diet, and 
personality by social norms, meaning these characteristics were in part acquired or learned as 
opposed to strictly being inherited. While the cultural elements of martial characteristics were 
not directly inheritable, they were still treated by the British as innate characteristics shared by 
all members of distinct races. Races came from different regions and possessed unique cultures 
which were passed on to future generations. Elements of culture and region of origin were thus, 
like genetic factors, seen as innate characteristics of specific races. Regardless of their origin, 
martial characteristics were traits which were present at a race level, meaning some races were 
innately more martial than others.  
Role of the Concept of Martial Races 
 The concept of martial races played a variety of important roles in the Indian Army, not 
least of which was its use to organize and guide recruitment. The effectiveness of the Army was 
dependent on sepoys who were disciplined, brave, loyal, and capable on the field of battle. In an 
effort to attract just such sepoys, British recruitment targeted martial races. Recruits from martial 
races still had to meet basic qualifications, such as physical requirements, before being allowed 
to join.20 Members of martial races were theoretically more likely to meet these minimum 
 
20 Discussion of these characteristics, requirements, and restrictions can be found in IOR:L/MIL/7/7067 
“Reorganisation and reduction of the Bombay Army and Introduction of the class system.” 8 November 1893 – 22 
November 1894. 
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requirements, so targeting them in effect pre-screened potential recruits, and thus helped to 
streamline the recruitment process.  
This pre-screening was important because effective recruitment relied on knowledgeable 
recruitment officers who built connections with the groups being targeted, a process which could 
not be done with every group. Recruiting sepoys was inherently difficult, because Indian natives 
were generally not inclined to volunteer for a foreign, colonial power to which they had no 
natural affinity or loyalty. British recruitment officers, specially trained in local customs and 
languages, were sent to build connections with local sources of power, such as maharajas,21 
prominent landowners, and other locally respected and important figures. This allowed the 
British to tap into local and more legitimate sources of patronage and influence, incentivizing 
recruitment beyond what the British could do themselves.  
Building local connections was a highly personalized process, so there is little 
documentation of exactly what recruitment officers did or promised. However, there were 
general strategies, some key components of which are briefly illustrated by an extract from an 
1894 report on recruiting desired races into the Bombay Army: 
In order to obtain satisfactory results in recruiting it is absolutely necessary that the 
British officers should acquaint themselves with the language, sentiments, and racial 
characteristics of the men under their command, and I am to observe… [that the resulting 
recruitment would] amply repay careful study by officers of the Bombay Army. I am also 
to suggest that the enlistment of recruits of a superior class might, in some instances, be 
 
21 Maharaja is a South Asian title of nobility, and has accorded varying degrees of importance over time. Under 
British rule, it was used to refer to the heads of the several hundred princely states, which were Indian vassal states 
under the British Raj. The population of these states varied from several thousand to several million. 
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facilitated if native gentlemen of real position and influence could be induced to take 
direct commissions in companies of their own class.22  
Prominent men (and/or their sons and other family members) were frequently offered officer 
commissions into the Army, providing them with further prestige and status. Presumably it also 
gave them a favored position with the British civil authorities, as well as greater status and power 
when their own kinsman and ethnic cohorts made up the military force in the area. These 
connections proved quite useful for the British, who often credited them with helping increase 
the number of recruits from desired groups that were otherwise unwilling to serve.23 
These connections could have multigenerational effects, as military service sometimes 
became an honorable family tradition, especially for Indian commissioned and non-
commissioned officers. This practice, though potentially effective in helping attract future 
generations of recruits, was still dependent on a range of other inducements. If new generations 
did not see any personal benefits to serving, not even familial connections would sway them to 
join. An illustration of this is provided by the Madras Cavalry in the mid-1890s, where British 
officers felt that “hereditary pride in the calling of arms [was] disappearing” as the sons of 
officers were no longer enlisting.24 When the Indian officers were asked why this was the case, 
they responded that the pay was too low. Soldiering, even when seen as honorable work, was 
 
22 Military Department document M 9486 1894, No. 2152-B, 1 October 1894, pages 4 –5. Part of 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7067 “Reorganisation and reduction of the Bombay Army and Introduction of the class system.” 8 
November 1893 – 22 November 1894. 
23 Such examples are mentioned in numerous documents on recruitment and reorganization. An illustrative case of a 
connection with a Rajput Maharaja leading to increased recruitment can be found in IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, 
“Reorganisation of the Bombay Army – altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 January 1895 – 25 
August 1897. 
24 Military Department document M 6381 1895, No. 117, “Letter to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India: 
Recommending that the Madras Cavalry should be included in the proposed increase of pay to the dismounted 
branches of the native army,” 25 June 1895, page 1. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7075 “Madras cavalry and Viceroy’s 
bodyguard increase of pay.” 23 January 1895 – 25 June 1895. 
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difficult and dangerous, and just like any other work, sufficient pay and other benefits had to be 
offered to attract quality recruits from martial races.  
The concept of martial races served not only to guide recruitment, but also to guide 
military organization. While some units comprised a mix of martial races, by the 1890s there was 
a strong preference for units organized by martial races. Individual companies generally 
comprised a single race, though the different companies in a regiment could be made from 
different races. There were general guidelines for this system of organization, and although 
mixed-race regiments were accepted, it was preferred to have no more than three or four 
different races in a regiment. Similarly, the unit balance of Muslim and Hindu soldiers was 
considered, such that one religion did not have too great of a majority over the other – though 
just what constituted too great a majority is not entirely clear. Organizing by race was seen as a 
way to increase the cohesion and effectiveness of the unit, while ensuring that the most martial 
races were being utilized to their maximum potential.25 
This system of race-based organization also applied to native officers, who generally 
served alongside sepoys of their own race, both for recruitment and practical purposes. As 
already mentioned, some officers had no prior military experience but were commissioned solely 
to build recruitment connections. Other officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) rose 
through the ranks, being promoted for meritorious and loyal service. Native officers were always 
subservient to British officers, by whom they were deemed inferior, and were limited to lower 
level commands.26 Despite this, native officers provided a valuable link between British officers 
 
25 These general guidelines, opinions, and patterns of recruitment are reflected in a variety of documents dealing 
with reorganization in the 1890s. For examples of all of them, see IOR:L/MIL/7/7084 “Changes in class 
composition of regiments of the Bombay cavalry.” 18 August 1898 – 24 March 1911. 
26 Particularly negative opinions on the capability of Indian officers can be seen throughout the correspondence of 
Field Marshal Frederick Roberts. He objected to the idea of granting Indian officers more responsibility, as well as 
to sending them to British war colleges, which he felt would be a waste. See Indian Series: Correspondence with 
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and the sepoys under their command, and they were sometimes retained in service even when the 
race of the men under their command changed. However, the general belief was that Indian 
officers of the same race as the men under their command had a more natural connection through 
shared language, religion, and regional background, making them a more effective intermediary 
between British officers and sepoys.27  
The British claimed that their system of race-based organization was preferred by the 
sepoys themselves, an assertion which does have some supporting evidence. Though the 
opinions of sepoys are difficult to get at directly, there are a few cases recorded in government 
documents that offer a glimpse. One such case is that of Sultan Khan, a native officer in the 124th 
Duchess of Connaught’s Own Baluchistan Infantry, who voluntarily retired early after 23 years 
of service. Khan, a member of the Ghilzai tribe, a group formerly considered a martial race, was 
retained upon the request of his superior British officer after the rest of the Ghilzai men in his 
company had been mustered out and replaced with a different race. Though he served in this 
newly reorganized unit for several more months, “he applied for his premature retirement as he, 
being the last remaining Ghilzai in the regiment, found himself alone of his own class and out of 
touch with the men of the company which he commanded.”28 Beyond the case of Sultan Khan, it 
 
England While Commander-in-Chief in India, 3rd January 1890 to 8th March 1893. Vol. IX, (Calcutta: Office of 
the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1893). This did change somewhat during the process known as 
“Indianisation,” the transfer of more authority to Indian officers following WWI. Even then, however, Indian 
officers remained subservient to their British superiors.   
27 These preferences were widely expressed, though a particularly succinct yet detailed example is Military 
Department document M 9480 1894 No. 165, “Letter to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India: Soliciting final 
approval to the proposals submitted for the reorganisation of the Bombay Army on the class company system,” part 
of IOR:L/MIL/7/7067 “Reorganisation and reduction of the Bombay Army and introduction of the class system.” 8 
November 1893 – 22 November 1894. 
28 The Ghilzai, also known as the Ghilji, are one of the tribes who make up the Pashtuns, also known as Pathans, a 
large Muslim, Pashto speaking ethnic group found in modern day Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Unfortunately, 
this record does not indicate which race replaced the Ghilzai in this unit. This is a self-ascribed group, not one 
defined by the British, and was recruited in large numbers. Military Department reference paper M 2169 1911, 2 
February 1911, part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7084 “Changes in class composition of regiments of the Bombay cavalry.” 18 
August 1898 – 24 March 1911. 
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seems reasonable that sepoys would prefer, or at least have no objection to, serving alongside 
people who were similar to them, often sharing the same language, religion, and caste, factors 
which naturally grouped people outside of the military.  
British views were not uniform, and reorganization based on race was criticized by some 
officers, who saw it as causing disruption and uncertainty. One such instance was the 
reorganization of several regiments of the Central India Horse in 1898, which called for 
squadrons comprised of non-martial races to be replaced with squadrons of martial races. Upon 
hearing the proposed changes, Lieutenant Colonel A. Masters, commander of the 2nd Regiment, 
responded with surprise and concern, writing: 
I have the honour to report that I have just learnt the class composition of the Central 
India Horse is to be changed. This order was quite unexpected, and has taken me and the 
2nd Central India Horse by surprise. I respectfully beg to point out that the 2nd Central 
India Horse has the nucleus of a Tewana squadron, and the 1st Central India horse has the 
nucleus of a Pathan squadron; and that it would be to the interest of the Government 
service for these squadrons to be completed and remain in their own regiments. 
Otherwise the regiments of Central India Horse will be completely disorganised for some 
time by wholesale transfers, which are invariably accompanied by heart-burnings and 
discontent.29 
It should be noted that Col. Masters was not disputing the role of martial races (he himself had 
proposed some restructuring to the race composition of his specific regiment), but only objected 
 
29 Tewana, also rendered Tiwana, are a Muslim clan from the Punjab. Military department document M 3642 1899, 
“Extract para. 2 of a letter from the Government of India, No. 40, dated 23rd March 1899,” page 3. Part of 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7086 “Local corps under the gov’t of India: changes in class compositions.” 13 October 1898 – 23 
March 1899. 
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to the immediate racial restructuring of entire squadrons. He warned that such sudden 
restructuring would cause discontent and uncertainty as sepoys found themselves out of a job, 
replaced by allegedly more martial races. The preferability of martial races was acknowledged, 
but altering unit composition too greatly could cause disorganization and discontent, 
counteracting the benefits of having more martial races. Some officers, like Col. Masters, 
preferred more gradual methods, such as replacing sepoys only as they retired or became 
casualties, as well as accepting voluntary transfers30 between different units. Gradual 
reorganization had its proponents, and was employed by some other units who saw it as more 
cost effective and less disruptive. However, Masters’ views were ignored, and the Central India 
Horse ordered an immediate reorganization. The Deputy Adjutant-General, Bengal argued that 
limiting the reorganization as Col. Masters suggested “would, if sanctioned, involve a departure 
from the class squadron system, which is an essential condition in any Native cavalry 
reconstitution.”31 Though there was a consensus that recruiting martial races was preferable, 
there was debate over how to implement them, as well as just which races should be considered 
martial.  
 
 
30 Voluntary transfers are frequently mentioned during discussions of reorganization along martial race lines, but 
little information is given on what exactly this entails. Presumably, sepoys would be given the option to transfer to 
units of their own race, which would indicate that race-based units had some degree of popularity amongst sepoys. 
The extent of these voluntary transfers is unclear, but one report explained “that no expenditure is directly involved 
by the changes unless voluntary transfers from one regiment to another are sanctioned, that the cost of such transfers 
would be small, and that the sanction of such transfers would depend on financial position. Otherwise, the proposed 
constitution of the regiments would be carried out gradually by the replacement of casualties by men of the required 
classes.” This suggests that any limits were for financial reasons. Military Department document M 9480 1894, 11 
September 1894, page 1, part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7067 “Reorganisation and reduction of the Bombay Army and 
Introduction of the class system.” 8 November 1893 – 22 November 1894. 
31 Military department document M 3642 1899, “Extract para. 2 of a letter from the Government of India, No. 40, 
dated 23rd March 1899.” Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7086 “Local corps under the gov’t of India: changes in class 
compositions.” 13 October 1898 – 23 March 1899. 
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Differing Opinions on Martial Races 
The debate over reorganization involved not only how to best conduct the reorganization, 
but also who was and was not martial. It would seem that organizing units based on the concept 
of martial races would be a straightforward process, since the martialness of certain races was 
supposedly innate and obvious enough to motivate reorganization in the first place. This was, 
however, far from the case. There was no consensus on which races were most martial, as 
different officers held their own opinions, biases, and prejudices. This debate was often quite 
vocal and was a prominent part of the reorganization of the 1890s.  
The reorganization of the Central Indian Horse, discussed in the previous section, was no 
exception to this debate. At one point during the reorganization, it was proposed that a squadron 
of Pathans be transferred from the 1st Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. E. 
Money, to the 2nd Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Masters. Col. Masters 
objected, stating:  
I did not advocate increasing the Pathan element in the regiment, as I have always been 
strongly opposed to an excess of this class, who are unsuited for the duties to be 
performed here [in the 2nd Regiment] owing to the numerous small detachments which 
the regiment has to maintain scattered over the country and not under the immediate 
control of their officers. I would mention that there are strong political reasons against 
increasing the number of Pathans in the Central India Horse… Should any doubt be 
entertained regarding the correctness of my assertion which is based on 24 years’ 
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experience in Central India, I request that this point may be referred to the Agent to the 
Governor-General in Central India for an expression of his views.32 
Col. Money agreed with Col. Masters in his objection to this transfer, though for the opposite 
reason – Col. Money considered the Pathans an effective race, and wished to keep them in his 
own regiment, where “many of them have served a long time, have done real good work, are 
contented and happy.” He considered the transfer of Pathans from his regiment to be an 
“unnecessary hardship both on the men and on the regiments.”33 The 1st Regiment was ultimately 
allowed to keep the Pathans, and the 2nd Regiment instead received a new squadron of Punjabi 
Muslims. The ultimate goal of this reorganization was to replace sepoys from non-martial races 
with martial ones, but regimental commanders had very different ideas of which races to 
consider martial. High command, which had overruled Col. Masters’ proposal for gradual 
introduction of more martial races, nonetheless deferred to his racial preference. Such debate 
over martial races and deference to the opinions of lower level commanders was a common 
theme of the reorganizations of the 1890s.  
 British officers discussed their racial preferences freely in their correspondence and 
responses to proposed reorganizations. One such example is illustrated by the 1897 proposal for 
reorganization of the 2nd Bombay Lancers,34 in which the existing squadrons of Deccani Muslims 
 
32 Unfortunately, Col. Masters did not elaborate on his claim that there were political reasons against increasing the 
number of Pathans, though it may have been in an attempt to maintain the desired proportions of Muslims versus 
Hindus. It was often feared that there would be discontent, and thus disobedience, if one religion became too 
dominant or was seen as receiving preferential treatment within a unit. Military department document M 3642 1899, 
“Extract para. 2 of a letter from the Government of India, No. 40, dated 23rd March 1899,” page 5. Part of 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7086 “Local corps under the gov’t of India: changes in class compositions.” 13 October 1898 – 23 
March 1899. 
33 Military department document M 3642 1899, “Extract para. 2 of a letter from the Government of India, No. 40, 
dated 23rd March 1899,” page 4. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7086 “Local corps under the gov’t of India: changes in class 
compositions.” 13 October 1898 – 23 March 1899. 
34 IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, “Reorganisation of the Bombay Army – altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 
January 1895 – 25 August 1897. 
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were replaced with Rajputs from western Rajputana.35 The Deccani Muslims had been serving 
with the unit for years, and the officers of the unit reported no problems with their capability as 
soldiers. However, the unit’s new commanding officer disagreed, claiming that the Deccani 
Muslims were inferior cavalry soldiers compared to their Rajput counterparts and that they 
should be replaced. This substitution was ultimately permitted, largely because the commanding 
officer claimed that a new connection with a maharaja in western Rajputana would lead to more 
Rajput recruits. However, this change did not happen without opposition from other officers, one 
of whom quipped that “[t]his changing and & chopping is a bad thing & leads to unrest. Every 
new C.O. [Commanding Officer] is seemingly allowed to indulge his own taste in castes. 
Why[?]”36  
 Similar complaints were lodged in other cases, such as the 1897 substitution of Rahtore 
Rajputs for non-Jat Sikhs in the 4th Bengal Cavalry.37 The new commanding officer of the 
regiment requested permission to remove all Sikhs, except for Jats,38 hoping to replace them with 
newly recruited Rahtore Rajputs on the grounds that the Sikhs made poor riders and poor 
recruits. In response to this, the Adjutant General in India, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Morton 
countered that “[i]f this statement applies only to the recruits so far enlisted for the squadron, the 
 
35 The Deccani Muslims are an ethnically diverse group who speak Dakhini, a dialect of Urdu, and who live 
throughout the Deccan Plateau. Rajputs are a self-ascribed group of primarily Hindu clans who are part of the 
Kshatriya varna, the military class of the varna system which classifies Hindu society. Here, the British classify both 
of these two groups along regional and religious lines, but varyingly incorporate linguistic and caste identity.  
36 This unsigned comment was hand-written in the margin of the minute paper ordering the change. Minute Paper M 
912 1897, “Caste constitution of the 2nd Bombay lancers.” Part of IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, “Reorganisation of the 
Bombay Army – altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 January 1895 – 25 August 1897. 
37 IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, “Reorganisation of the Bombay Army – altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 
January 1895 – 25 August 1897. 
38 Jats are agriculturalists from northern India. They comprise a variety of faiths, including Sikhs, Hindus, and 
Muslims. The officer likely excluded them because agriculturalists were often considered by the British to possess a 
stronger physique and to not have been spoiled by the comforts of urban life. For further discussion of this topic, see 
chapter 1 of Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and 
Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).  
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remedy lies in the commanding officer’s own hands,”39 seeing any poor performance as the fault 
of the new officer, not the Sikhs. Going further, Morton pointed out that if the new commanding 
officer’s statements applied to Sikhs generally, he need only look to the 2nd Bombay Lancers, 
who served in the same area, or to the cavalry regiments of the Punjab and Bengal, where non-
Jat Sikhs served in large numbers without any complaints. Despite the exemplary service of 
Sikhs in other units and the opposition of the Adjutant General, the request for substitution was 
ultimately granted.   
 This substitution of Rajputs for Sikhs in the 4th Bengal Cavalry is a particularly 
interesting case for two reasons. First, both Rajputs and Sikhs were often understood (including 
among themselves) to be martial, both groups having traditions of military service predating 
British rule. In this instance it seems that the commanding officer was more a fan of Rajputs, 
perhaps out of some personal bias for them over another major “Hindu” martial race. Second, it 
is notable that this substitution was allowed, even though it originated from a relatively low-
ranking officer. Individual officers were permitted a great deal of leeway to “indulge their own 
taste in castes,”40 even when opposed by other officers. If it were not for this deference to the 
opinions of individual officers when dealing with their own units, the great deal of variation in 
opinion between different officers would have been much less consequential, as they would have 
had to follow whatever martial race ideas the high command preferred. Decentralized decision 
making is thus a key component of why martial races were so variable; individual experiences, 
 
39 Military Department document M 2128 1897, “Enclosure No. 1 to Extract para. 7 of a letter from the Government 
of India, No. 20, dated 10th February 1897,” page 2. Part of IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, “Reorganisation of the Bombay 
Army – altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 January 1895 – 25 August 1897. 
40 Paraphrasing the previously mentioned anonymous comment in footnote 31, Minute Paper M 912 1897, “Caste 
constitution of the 2nd Bombay lancers.” Part of IOR:/L/MIL/7/7071, “Reorganisation of the Bombay Army – 
altered class composition of certain regiments.” 30 January 1895 – 25 August 1897. 
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biases, and tastes led to situations where the races considered martial by some officers were 
objected to by others.  
The level of specificity used to define martial races was also a source of debate and 
variability. Though there were general perceptions of martialness along such broad lines as 
Muslims verses Hindus, martial races were usually carefully qualified, such as with the 
specification of Rahtore Rajputs instead of Rajputs generally or Hindus as a whole. That the 
commanding officer in the 4th Bengal Cavalry considered all non-Jat Sikhs to be unfit for 
military service was a broad generalization in contrast to the perception of the Adjutant General 
and other officers. Others preferred to define martial races very specifically. E. H. H. Collen, the 
Secretary to the Government of India, commented on this point while weighing in on the 
reorganization of the Bombay Army. Using the Bengal Army as a comparison, he argued that the 
definition of race used in the Bombay reorganization proposal was too broad, writing: 
‘Rajputana Hindus’ or ‘Foreign (i.e., North-Western Provinces and Oudh)41 Hindus’ is 
hardly a sufficient distinction, and would permit of an undesirable mixture of castes in 
each company, or troop of these classes. For instance, Rajputs and Jats should not be 
mixed, but kept in separate companies or squadrons. The same argument applies to 
Mahrattas, who are divided, like other Hindus, into a large number of classes or castes. 
The Government of India consider that the particular Mahratta caste of which each troop 
or company is to consist, should, if possible, be specified, only fighting classes being 
enlisted. Among Mahomedans, again, it seems doubtful whether the term ‘Mahomedans 
from the Bombay recruiting area’ is sufficiently definite… Some such distinction as that 
 
41 In this context, “foreign” means coming from outside of the Bombay presidency. The North-Western Provinces 
and Oudh were part of the Bengal Presidency.  
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involved in the terms ‘Hindustani Mahomedan’ and ‘Punjabi Mahomedan’ should, it is 
thought, be established between the inhabitants of the various territorial divisions of the 
Bombay recruiting grounds, and the racial groups thus formed should be treated as 
separate classes for the purposes of the scheme under consideration.42 
Officers like Collen feared that using too broad a definition for specific martial races would 
allow for less-martial races to creep in, as well as lead to the combination of martial races which 
were not seen to mix well with one another. Just how precise a definition was preferred varied 
from officer to officer and region to region. This variability is not surprising, given the differing 
perceptions of martialness that officers held, as well as the different identities and characteristics 
(such as religion, geography, and caste) used to define martial races. 
 There was no single unified set of criteria to decide which races to consider martial, 
despite the concept of martial races being near universally accepted by the British, who relied on 
it as a major organizing component of the Indian Army. Certain opinions predominated over 
others, and certain races were more and less frequently recruited over the decades. The general 
trends seen across decades were not the result of a gradually changing consensus, but the 
outcome of a constant debate in which certain opinions, often temporarily, prevailed against stiff 
opposition.  
 
 
 
42 Military Department document M 9480 1894 No. 2152-B, 1 October 1894, page 5. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7067 
“Reorganization and reduction of the Bombay Army and Introduction of the class system.” 8 November 1893 – 22 
November 1894. 
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Inducement and Indirect Influence  
 Though drawing from existing identities, classification as a martial race was externally 
imposed on sepoys and came to regulate many aspects of their lives. Being part of a martial race 
determined whether an Indian could even enlist in the military. Once enlisted, their identity as a 
martial race determined which units sepoys could serve in. Sepoys frequently found themselves 
at the mercy of the varying British perceptions on martial races. Even after decades of 
satisfactory service, sepoys could find themselves forced out because their new officer had a 
distaste for their race. However, sepoys were not helpless, and had a great deal of indirect 
influence over their situation, both in spite of and because of the concept of martial races that 
came to define them.  
British insistence on recruiting only martial races, combined with the fear of revolt, 
provided sepoys with enough indirect influence to ensure acceptable treatment and compensation 
for their service. Central to this indirect influence was the recognized mercenary nature of 
sepoys. Though they had no natural affinity or loyalty towards their British rulers, various 
bonuses and benefits attracted a sufficient supply of martial recruits and ensured their continuing 
loyalty after enlistment. Though the exact reason for joining was unique to each sepoy, these 
financial benefits were perhaps the single greatest incentive. 
 As discussed previously, recruitment was directed at martial races, and there was a strong 
desire to avoid recruiting the poor and the non-martial out of concern over their poor 
performance and discipline. This limited the size of the recruitment pool from which the British 
could draw, and necessitated the use of local connections and skilled recruitment officers. These 
connections could only go so far, however, and had to be backed up by sufficient pay. The 1880s 
saw a decrease in the number and quality of recruits, especially for the cavalry, which had higher 
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expenses due to the maintenance of horses. In 1890, cavalry pay was increased, and recruits 
proved more forthcoming. By 1895, there were calls for a similar increase in pay for the 
dismounted branches, such as infantry, as the cavalry was drawing away recruits.43 Responding 
to these complaints, the government of India concluded that: 
the pay of the noncommissioned officers and privates in the Mountain batteries, the 
Sappers and Miners, and the Infantry should be substantially increased. There is great 
difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of recruits of the proper stamp, the rate of 
wages generally throughout India has risen, and heavier duties are required of the Native 
army than formerly. In 1890, the pay of the native cavalry was raised… with most 
satisfactory results, and the time has now arrived for an increase to the pay of the 
dismounted branches… The necessity for the increase is beyond question.44   
Like any other employer, the Indian Army had to compete with other fields of employment. With 
no conscription, they had no choice but to raise sepoy pay.  
 Beyond aiding recruitment, pay was also seen as an essential means to maintain loyalty. 
The threat of revolt was implicit because of the mercenary nature of sepoys, and this unspoken 
threat served as their greatest source of indirect influence. The specter of the 1857 Mutiny 
haunted the British, leaving them wary of the disastrous consequences of sepoy discontent. This 
influence can be seen acting alongside the declining recruitment in the 1890s, as multiple 
officers voiced their concerns in a confidential letter to the secretary of state for India, writing:  
 
43 IOR:L/MIL/7/7070. “Increase of pay to dismounted branches.” 23 January 1895 – 4 July 1895. 
44 Military Department Minute Paper M 1585 1895, 23 January 1895. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7070. “Increase of pay 
to dismounted branches.” 23 January 1895 – 4 July 1895. 
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The subject of the pay and position of the Native soldier in India is one of the greatest 
importance. The Native Army is bound to us by no ties of blood or patriotism, and the 
Government of India have always recognized the necessity for ensuring the efficiency 
and loyalty of the troops by such reasonable concessions to them as the improvement in 
the condition of the classes from which they are drawn appeared to demand… although 
every effort has been made to increase the comfort and well-being of the Native soldier, it 
has been obvious to us, for several years past, that the time was rapidly approaching 
when we must advise Her Majesty’s Government to sanction a substantial increase to the 
pay of the Native Army.45  
Showing just how important the British perceived sepoy pay to be, these calls for pay increases 
met with much less resistance than most other proposals, and what little debate there was 
centered not on whether there should be an increase, but on how much the increase needed to be. 
These raises were not motivated by any goodness of the British, but out of the desire to recruit 
members of martial races and to purchase loyalty to British control. Though sepoys had no direct 
bargaining power, their potential to revolt indirectly ensured satisfactory compensation, both 
through pay and other financial benefits, such as batta.46 
 In addition to their standard pay, sepoys also received batta, which was essentially an 
extra allowance or bonus given to cover living expenses such as food, travel, and other costs. 
Batta was a longstanding custom in South Asia, and had been paid to sepoys from the early days 
 
45 Military Department document M 1585 1895, 23 January 1895, page 1. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7070. “Increase of 
pay to dismounted branches.” 23 January 1895 – 4 July 1895. 
46 These pay increases are not isolated events, but common responses to declining recruitment and fears of waning 
loyalty. See also IOR:L/MIL/7/7075, “Madras cavalry and Viceroy’s bodyguard increase of pay.” 23 January 1895 – 
25 June 1895.; and IOR:L/MIL/7/ 7077, “Local corps under the gov’t of India: increase of pay.” 29 January 1896 – 
13 May 1896. 
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of service under the British.47 The exact allowances given varied over time, being adjusted to 
reflect the cost of goods in certain areas.48 Batta was frequently given to help cover the cost of 
food, which had seasonal and regional fluctuation that could cause a great deal of hardship for 
sepoys and their dependents. The rates for food batta were generally adjusted to changing prices 
of rice and wheat, which, though adding complexity to the payment system, was considered 
necessary to minimize sepoy discontent. An illustrative example is provided by the debate over a 
1901 Finance Committee proposal to fix the rate of batta to make it easier to calculate payments. 
Several high ranking British officers objected, writing in response that “the result [of the 
proposed fixing of rates] in the Native army would be starvation, inefficiency, and discontent. In 
His Excellency’s opinion, there can be no doubt whatever that to keep the Native army contented 
there must be a sliding scale which automatically makes up to the sepoy for the fluctuations 
arising from the season.”49 The proposal was ultimately dropped, and variable rates were 
maintained, albeit in a streamlined form. Though fluctuating batta was an added expense for the 
British, the stability it provided was considered worth the cost; sepoys’ hardships in the face of 
 
47 The uncertain origins and military history of batta are described in the Hobson-Jobson, a period Anglo-Indian 
dictionary written by British officers. Batta predated the arrival of the British, and similar allowances were paid to 
sepoys serving the Portuguese, whose presence in South Asia goes back to the sixteenth century. There were several 
similar, possibly etymologically related terms in Hindi and Portuguese. Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell, Hobson-
Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrase, and of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, 
Geographical, and Discursive, ed. William Crooke (London: John Murray, 1903).  
48 In general, batta was increased when serving in areas with more difficult terrain, poor living conditions, or higher 
costs of provisions. For a report briefly covering some of these different regional rates over time, see 
IOR:L/MIL/7/7074, “Special monetary privileges of the Native Army.” 8 May 1895 – 25 June 1895. 
49 This quote is from Colonel B. Duff, the Officiating Adjutant-General in India. Several other officers lodged 
similar complaints. In the quoted text, “His Excellency” refers to Sir Arthur Palmer, the Commander-in-Chief in 
India from 1900–1902, who also submitted a response objecting to the proposed fixing of batta rates. That the 
holders of such prominent positions objected to the proposal is telling. It is also notable that the proposal, which 
arose from two Lieutenant-Colonels and which was unpopular higher up, was still given a hearing. This speaks to 
the relative decentralization of power and the ability of lower-ranking officers to attempt to effect change in the 
Indian Army. Military Department document M 4378 1902, Extract para. 18 of a despatch from the Government of 
India, No. 44, dated the 6th March 1902. Part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7112, “System of compensation for dearness of 
provisions and forage to the native troops and followers.” 27 June 1901 – 28 January 1904. 
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changing conditions could be at least partially countered, helping to keep them more contented 
and loyal. 
 A variety of other bonuses were also given to sepoys. Rewards were given for good 
performance and loyalty, such as good conduct pay, prizes for good shooting and 
swordsmanship, and gratuities for long and meritorious service. Others were designed, like batta, 
to cover occasional expenses, like compensation for repair of arms, shoeing of horses, house 
rent, railway charges, passage money, postage and telegram fees, and kit money. Bonuses were 
also awarded on certain occasions, such as New Year’s Day batta and Her Majesty’s birthday 
batta. Bonuses were also aimed at sepoys’ families and dependents, such as family allowances 
and allowances for girls’ schools and school books.50 These bonuses helped to ensure that the 
basic needs of sepoys and their families were covered, while helping to attract new recruits and 
ensuring loyalty.  
 Alongside pay and batta, pensions served as another important inducement for sepoys, 
and perhaps the one that they had the most direct influence over. Pensions are, by their very 
nature, both a carrot and a stick – they can bring great benefit to the recipient, but they are 
conditioned on years of loyal service, compelling one to stay in line or face losing out. This 
made pensions attractive to both the British and sepoys. The longer a sepoy served and the 
higher the rank he achieved, the greater his pension. However, the years of continued service 
necessary for a pension was at odds with the fluctuation in delineating martial races. Sepoys who 
were otherwise giving good service could find themselves mustered out and their pensions cut 
short due to their race no longer being considered martial. On the other hand, British officers 
 
50 These various bonuses are officially sanctioned by the Army Regulations, India, and covered in detail in various 
financial reports. See Selections from the Army Regulations, India, for the use of District Officers in the Civil 
Department. Calcutta: Civil Department, India, 1895; see also IOR:L/MIL/7/7082, “Reorganisation and reduction of 
the Madras Governor’s body guard and Madras cavalry establishment.” 16 December 1896 – 28 July 1898. 
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frequently called for increased pensions for the sepoys under their command. If the duration of a 
sepoys’ service fell a few years short of eligibility for receiving a higher pension rate, it was 
often requested that they be given the higher-level pension, which they presumably would have 
attained had they not been arbitrarily mustered out. These requests were normally granted. Why 
exactly higher pensions were granted is not entirely clear. The requests for increase generally 
cite the good service that an individual sepoy provided, thus serving as a similar reward to good-
conduct pay. Though not explicitly stated, it seems the rationale for these increases would have 
been similar to that for other bonuses – to reduce discontent and show potential recruits that they 
would be looked after even if they were mustered out.51 
 To illustrate the general procedure of pension increases, the reorganization of the 2nd 
Bombay Lancers, discussed in the previous section, once again serves as an excellent example. 
As the Deccani Muslims were being replaced with Rajputs, the British thought that the 
remaining Deccani officers and NCOs would be out of place in the newly reorganized regiment, 
and would block promotion opportunities for Rajputs. Thus, several non-Rajput officers were 
reassigned to other regiments where Deccani Muslims were still serving. However, there were 
not enough vacancies for all of the remaining officers and NCOs, and the remainder had to be 
mustered out. These men had served for between 21 and 28 years, and had most likely intended 
to continue serving for several years more to secure a higher pension. To solve this dilemma, the 
commanding officer of the 2nd Bombay Lancers requested that these remaining officers and 
 
51 Detailed pension rates by years of service, as well as examples of sepoys receiving higher pensions upon 
discharge can be seen in IOR:L/MIL/7/7079, “Hyderabad Contingent – reorganization and liability for general 
service.” 18 August 1896 – 7 August 1914. A basic outline of pension scales is also given in Selections from the 
Army Regulations, India, for the use of District Officers in the Civil Department. Calcutta: Civil Department, India, 
1895. 
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NCOs receive pensions of one rate higher than their current duration of service entitled them to, 
decreasing the financial impact of their premature discharge.52  
Another example is the pension increase awarded to Sultan Khan, the previously 
mentioned Ghilzai officer in the 124th Duchess of Connaught’s Own Baluchistan Infantry. 
Having risen through the ranks on his own merit, Khan voluntarily retired early because he felt 
out of place after the other Ghilzai sepoys in his unit had been mustered out, no longer 
considered martial by their British officers. His commanding officer, however, had initially 
asked that he stay in the newly reformed unit, and put in a request for a higher pension after he 
decided to retire one year short of a higher pension rate.53 Requests for pension increases are one 
of the few cases in Military Department documents where sepoys were treated as individuals, 
their names given and their service commended by their British officers. In most other cases, 
sepoys were lumped together, referred to only through their units and races with no individual 
identity.  
As in every military, the Indian Army also employed a variety of disciplinary measures. 
Sepoys were subject to numerous punishments under military law, ranging from fines to flogging 
to execution. These Indian Army punishments were based on British Army codes, and generally 
followed those applied to British soldiers.54 However, a degree of leniency was not uncommon 
because the Indian Army was a volunteer force – if punishments were too severe, sepoys would 
quit. Recruiting replacements would be difficult, and the British could not afford to too greatly 
 
52 IOR:L/MIL/7/7076, “Class constitution of the Bombay Army – retirement of low-caste native officers.” 10 
September 1895 – 16 September 1897. 
53 Military Department reference paper M 2169 1911, 2 February 1911, part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7084 “Changes in 
class composition of regiments of the Bombay cavalry.” 18 August 1898 – 24 March 1911. 
54 For more detailed discussion on the disciplinary policy of the Indian Army and how it compared to British policy, 
see chapter 2 of Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and 
Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).  
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damage their relationship with martial groups. Because of this, the British focused on carrots 
rather than sticks to ensure loyalty and discipline.  
Field Marshall Frederick Roberts, Commander in Chief in India from 1885–1893, was a 
prominent supporter of lenient use of punishment. He thought that this was more conducive to 
keeping sepoys contented, which therefore made them more loyal and effective. He explained his 
views in an 1890 letter to Lord Randolph Churchill, writing:  
Some years ago when in Madras I urged upon Commanding Officers the desirability of 
treating crime, especially in the case of young soldiers, with leniency, and abolishing all 
needless restrictions on the liberty of well-behaved men. The results were so satisfactory 
that I repeated the order when I took up the chief command in India.55  
Similarly, Roberts advocated treating sepoys according to their own customs – or, at least, what 
the British understood their customs to be – in order to keep them contented. He explained this 
view in an 1892 letter of advice to Major General Barker, commander of the Indian Army 
detachment in Hong Kong, opining that: 
native troops require in many respects treatment different from that accorded to British 
soldiers. They have not a few peculiar customs and some prejudices, and though many of 
these are really unimportant yet they are much attached to them. Our system of dealing 
with native troops in India is based on long experience, and is so framed as to be in 
keeping with the national habits of the soldiers to whom it applies, as far as is consistent 
 
55 Letter LXXVII in Indian Series: Correspondence with England While Commander-in-Chief in India, 3rd January 
1890 to 8th March 1893. Vol. IX, (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1893). 
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with military feeling and discipline. It has, moreover, one immense advantage, that it is 
thoroughly understood by the men.56  
The payment of batta, an essential part of recruitment and discipline, is an example of the 
“peculiar customs” which the British followed. Though Robert’s letters show the paternalism 
and condescension typical of the British, they reflect the understanding that harsh discipline was 
less effective than inducement. If the British hoped to field a martial and loyal army, they had to 
be willing to treat and pay sepoys well enough. That is not to say that the life of a sepoy was a 
particularly lavish one, but soldiering was made sufficiently attractive compared to the 
alternatives to make it worthwhile.    
Conclusion – Power, Fear, and Fantasy  
The quest for power motivated British imperial policy, but not always in the most 
obvious way. That an empire would seek to expand its power is a given, but equally important 
was the inverse of power – security. Whether accurate or misplaced, the fear of losing power was 
very real to the British, and enormously influential. The internal fear of another mutiny like 1857 
is what led to the formalization of the concept of martial races in the first place, as the British 
sought to recruit only loyal and martial soldiers. The external fear of a Russian invasion made 
recruitment of martial races urgent, as only a select few Indian races were considered capable of 
fighting the Russians. Paradoxically, the most martial sepoys were also a source of fear for the 
British, as it was understood that they were perfectly capable of revolting or refusing to fight 
against the Russians if they became discontented with their British superiors.  
 
56 Letter CCXXIV in Indian Series: Correspondence with England While Commander-in-Chief in India, 3rd 
January 1890 to 8th March 1893. Vol. IX, (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 
1893). 
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A central part of this fear was instability. Both internal and external threats could upset 
the status quo and threaten British power. However, if the British had the best, most martial 
soldiers, they would be better prepared for whatever threats emerged. Ironically, though the 
concept of martial races itself was stable (it was employed until the end of British rule, and 
lingers on informally to the present), the racial content of the concept was anything but. Even 
though martialness was supposedly based on innate characteristics, which particular races were 
considered martial varied, leading to frequent unit reorganization and instability.  
 British paranoia, however off the mark, was not entirely unfounded. Though there was 
never another mutiny on the level of 1857, minor internal mutinies did occur, as when a Pashtun 
squadron of the 13th Bengal Lancers attempted to mutiny in 1898.57 The attempt was quickly put 
down without loss of life, though such events kept the British wary. The external threat also 
eventually materialized – not from the Russians, but from the Germans in the First World War. 
The unification of the Indian Army did pay off, as hundreds of thousands of sepoys fought in 
Europe and the Middle East. Many more fought in the next world war, even defending India 
against the Japanese.  
It was the fear of losing power in India, either through Russian invasion or internal revolt, 
that guided the army reforms of the 1890s. The Army’s consistent doctrine was that the right 
reforms, the right organization, and the right races would create the perfect system to preserve 
British power. What exactly was “right” was the fantasy of individual officers, who argued 
amongst themselves over what they saw as the greatest threats and which races they personally 
 
57 Unfortunately, few specific details about the scope of this mutiny are given. Three sepoys were court martialed 
and sentenced, respectively, to one year four months, and nine months imprisonment with hard labor. The rest of the 
squadron was later disbanded and the sepoys mustered out. The British found the cause to be discontent due to an 
unpopular British officer and the fact that the native officers in the squadron came from a different Pashtun tribe 
than the rest of the men. Military Department document M 10387 1898, part of IOR:L/MIL/7/7085, “Changes in the 
cast construction of regiments: Bengal Army.” 6 October 1898. 
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considered the most martial. The idea that there truly was such a thing as an innately martial race 
was its own fantasy, and, ultimately, so were the fears of Russian Invasion and a widespread 
mutiny. Yet, these security fears had a very real impact, guiding British policy decisions and 
giving indirect power to sepoys.  
Scope for Future Research 
 It is important to note other elements of army recruitment practices, namely sepoy land 
grants and martial race recruitment handbooks, which are widely reported in secondary sources, 
but which were not found in my primary sources. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
sepoys were often awarded land after completing their service. In the Punjab, parcels were 
opened up in Canal Colonies, model agricultural settlements established by the British.58 For 
landless sepoys, land grants would doubtlessly have been a major inducement, yet such grants 
were not mentioned in any of the Military Department documents reviewed while researching 
this paper, not even those which gave extensive lists of other forms of batta. This may be 
because land grants were managed by the Revenue Department, and so would not have been 
considered in Military Department documents. It is interesting that such a useful recruitment 
incentive was not controlled by the military. 
 The lack of mention of recruitment handbooks is harder to explain. Starting in 1890 and 
continuing until the First World War, the British published official recruitment handbooks 
detailing what characteristics defined the most martial of races and which races ought to be 
 
58 Land grants are widely cited as an important inducement. See chapter 4 of Kaushik Roy, Brown Warriors of the 
Raj: Recruitment and the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913, (New Delhi: Manohar. 2008); see 
also chapter 2 of Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and 
Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).  
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targeted by recruitment officers.59 Though these manuals were published contemporaneously, 
there is not a single mention of any such handbook in my primary sources, not even during 
discussions of recruitment strategies. This absence, combined with the fact that officers had 
widely varying and contradicting opinions on which races to consider martial, indicates that 
these handbooks may have had little real influence. There are several potential reasons for this. 
The leeway given to lower-ranking officers in making recruitment and organizational decisions, 
described earlier, may mean that there was no requirement to use the handbooks, and officers 
who disagreed with them could disregard them. The personalized nature of the recruitment 
process could also have limited the usefulness of generalized and inflexible handbooks. It is also 
possible that it took years for the use of handbooks to become widespread, putting their influence 
beyond the timeframe of this paper. Further research is needed to test these hypotheses.   
 Lastly, it is also important to note the limited temporal scope of this paper. The 
widespread variation in British perceptions of martial races seen during the 1890s may not 
extend to other periods. The 1890s was a period of restructuring situated between major conflict 
in Afghanistan and Burma in the preceding decade, and the most destructive war the world had 
yet seen in the next century. The unique conditions of the 1890s may well have allowed for 
widespread debate that was not present in other periods, and it is hazardous to extrapolate. 
Despite these limitations, the reforms carried out in the 1890s dictated the state of the Indian 
Army going into World War One. The decade saw further evolution of the concept of martial 
races, which was formalized after the 1857 Mutiny and has continued, though more obscurely, to 
influence modern South Asian militaries.  
 
59 A basic overview of the recruitment handbooks can be found in chapter 1 of Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of 
Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015) For a 
more detailed discussion of the handbooks, see chapter 3 of Kaushik Roy, Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment 
and the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913, (New Delhi: Manohar. 2008) 
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Appendix 
Military Map of India, 1893 
 
This map of India from 1893 shows major cities, regions, and the areas of the presidency armies.  
Bengal is pink, Bombay is green, and Madras is yellow. Map scanned from Constable's Hand 
Atlas of India. United Kingdom: A. Constable and Company. 1893. 
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Groups Commonly Recruited as Martial Races 
 The following is a list of groups that were commonly recruited as martial races during the 
1890s. This list is based on my review of Military Department documents, and is not exhaustive 
or official. Some races were more popular than others, and all had their fans and detractors. 
Larger races often had many subgroups, which were generally, though not always, considered 
comparably martial. 
Races from the Punjab, such as Sikhs, and especially Jat Sikhs; 
Rajputs, including Rahtore Rajputs; 
Pashtuns, including Ghilzai, Afridi, and other subgroups; 
Baluch; 
Gurkhas; 
Deccani Muslims; 
Dogras; 
Marathi  
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